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William Forster and the critique of democracy in colonial New South
Wales.
Gregory Melleuish University of Wollongong
The introduction of what have termed 'democratic' regimes into mid
nineteenth century Australia in the form of the granting of responsible
government to the Australian colonies has been treated in recent times as an
unproblematic process. The quasi-official version of political development in
the colonies, as found in the Discovering Democracy civics education
programme sponsored by the Commonwealth government and expressed in
the textbook written for the programme by Dr John Hirst, is that this was
the first stage on the road to 'real' democracy in Australia, the final stage
of which will be the establishment of an Australian republic. As Hirst sees
it, the people and their politicians embraced it as an advance on the road to
freedom. 1
This is Whig history in full bloom. It is an anachronistic reading of
the past in the light of current preoccupations. One of the problems is the
ambiguity of the word 'democracy'. For many nineteenth century writers it
was a problematic word associated with anarchy, the violence of the French
Revolution and the descent into civil war in America. Supporters of popular
politics in the Australian colonies preferred to be known as liberals; it was
even preferable to be called a liberal conservative than a conservative.
This paper will divide into two roughly equal parts. The first will
discuss the issue of democracy in the Australian colonies generally and in
New South Wales in particular. It will especially focus on the issue of
democracy versus mixed government and why many colonial writers were
uneasy with the concept of democracy. The second will examine in some
detail the critique that William Forster, at one time premier of New South
Wales, made of democracy and its workings in the Australian colonies.
Democracy in colonial New South Wales and its Critics
It was, and remains, difficult to know in what sense the Australian
colonies could be described as democratic. For Hirst the touchstone would
seem to be universal suffrage for parliamentary elections. Of course for
the ancient Athenians election indicated an aristocratic regime, and as we
shall see many colonial writers understood responsible government founded
on manhood suffrage as the embodiment of an aristocratic form of
government. Not all the colonies initially embraced universal manhood
suffrage and all adopted an Upper House that was either nominated or
elected on a restricted franchise. In New South Wales plural voting
remained and rural voters enjoyed an advantage in representation over their
city counterparts. Unlike America many local officials were not elected.
In The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy Hirst mentions the lack
of local government and the growth of state bureaucracy in such areas as
education. 2 But unlike Alan Atkinson he does not discuss the
'democratisation' of colonial churches nor does he discuss the development
of 'civil society' and voluntary organisations such as the ANA which Bob
Birrell emphasises in his analysis of the origins of the federation movement.'
The other sense in which democracy was used in the nineteenth
century was derived from Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy meant social
equality, the absence of ranks and distinctions; it was a social state rather
than a system of politics." In this sense the Australian colonies could be
understood as democracies.
It is interesting that Hirst bemoans the fact that democracy in New
South Wales only had this social meaning.5 He sees the establishment of a
democratic order in New South Wales as a failure because republicanism did
not succeed and colonial politicians continued to have a fondness for British
customs. Hirst argues that colonial democrats were duplicitous in that they
had to pretend not to be democrats but liberals. They talked of 'widening
the franchise' or making it more liberal rather than of democracy. 6 This
assumes that the colonial politicians were attempting to establish what Hirst
understands and commends as democracy as opposed with just coming to
terms with that new experimental form of polity known as 'responsible
government'.
This also comes through in Hirst's argument that colonial liberals were
in fact democrats in disguise who shied away from the word 'democracy'
because of its bad associations? The evidence indicates, in fact, that
colonial commentators were able to distinguish between 'liberals' and
'democrats'. The problem is that Hirst does not engage with the concept of
democracy and that his understanding of democracy lacks theoretical
sophistication. In Australia's Democracy the chapter following the one on
colonial democracy is entitled 'Real Democracy' and it is somewhat ironic that
it includes discussion of both Aboriginal disenfranchisement and White
Australia, both products of Australian 'real democracy'.
Other scholars have placed less emphasis on colonial democracy or
understood it differently from Hirst. In their classic study of factional
politics Martin and Loveday hardly use the word 'democracy' preferring to
follow colonial usage and refer to liberclism.f In his recent History of
Europeans in Australia volumeII, subtitled democracy and covering the
colonial period, Alan Atkinson does not define democracy in political terms
but rather, like Tocqueville, sees it in terms of a state of society. However,
unlike Tocqueville, his focus is not the mores and customs of colonial
Australia as expressed in functioning local social and political institutions.
For him, Australian democracy in the nineteenth century is to be understood
in terms of the relationship between people, the dreams and aspirations of
those people and how they imagined themselves."
In his The State and the PeopleJ M Ward argues that the Liberals in
New South Wales rejected the traditional English model of the mixed
constitution but accepted the idea of a 'natural aristocracy' that would allow
people like James Macarthur to have their rightful place in the new political
order. He also contends that 'colonial liberals and conservatives alike could
have called on Burke,.lD Colonial liberals became more conservative during
the 1860s and a common set of political values united both conservatives and
radicals in New South Wales under the heading 'liberalism'. He characterised
the outcome as follows:
The democratic impulse of the 1850s had exhausted itself. At the
end of the 1860s manhood suffrage and the secret ballot were
secure; so also, however, were unequal electorates and the nominated
Legislative Council. Colonial liberalism was triumphant in New South
Wales. Everyone with a political voice to use knew that it could be
used. No one with a future to make (according to the social
expectations of the time) had cause to fear that society would
withhold opportunity. Land law amendments were being made as they
seemed to be needed. Increasingly there was education for all who
sought it. The economy was expansive. 11
'Democracy', according to Ward, compromised and became acceptable as part
of a complex and fundamentally conservative political and social order. As
we shall see, Ward is correct in that it was the Burkean conception of
representation that became dominant in colonial New South Wales.
The reality was far more complex than Hirst's anachronistic view of
the matter. The colonists were not seeking twenty first century democracy.
Their understanding of key political concepts was often ambiguous. They
knew that they wanted 'responsible government', they were keen to
implement the principles of what they understood to be 'liberalism' and they
remained reverential towards the 'British Constitution'.
The case of the term 'democracy' was more complex. All of the other
political concepts that circulated in the colonies came out of evolving British
political practice. Democracy was an abstract term associated with ancient
Athens, the French Revolution or America. The Australian colonists wanted
good government and they had a faith that the British Constitution
delivered good government. They needed conceptual tools when their own
local versions of that constitution performed poorly. When many colonial
writers came to find problems with the workings of their political system
they tended to focus on its democratic elements.
Criticism of, and opposition to, democracy was based both on principle
and a very real fear that the workings of democracy were not conducive to
good government. One must ask: did the men of the 1850s know exactly
what they were creating? While there was great debate over the franchise
there was little or no discussion regarding the principles on which
government generally should be founded. The colonists by and large assumed
that they would be having a copy of what operated in England, 'responsible
government'. Much of their faith in 'responsible government' derived from a
'prejudice' in its favour.
It is difficult to know how much they appreciated the meaning and
significance of responsible government as a form of government. After all,
as Ward has argued, responsible government was relatively new in BritainY
British politics sti II contained a highly significant aristocratic element. It
was not unreasonable for Macarthur and Wentworth to argue for a colonial
aristocracy if a colonial polity was to remain a form of 'mixed government'.
The notion of mixed government entails a suspicion of human nature.
Colonial liberals, however, had a naive faith that a natural harmony existed in
the world and that once the forces of tradition were unshackled that
harmony would assert itselfP The 'goodness of the people' and the genial
power of nature would overcome all. This idealism can be seen in the two
following passages from the 1850s:
Democracy is not to come-is not a dream or anticipation of the
future. Democracy is all around us-it is part of the atmosphere we
breathe-of the all-embracing Heaven under which we live.
A true Democracy must be ever progressive; the influence of the
people must day by day be at once penetrating and extensive; until
every department of civil government-every act of the
administration-shall reflect the national conscience, and express the
national judgment."
It can be seen just how vague the use of 'democracy' is in both of these
quotes. It refers to a 'spirit' or a general hope rather than to any specific
understanding of the workings of politics or administration.
Australian colonial liberals often looked to America as a model for
their government. The Empire newspaper described America as 'a Hercules
in Infancy' and as 'dignifying national greatness in Democracy'.15 Unlike the
American founding fathers, however, they had little understanding or
appreciation of the importance of either the need for 'checks and balances'
or the separation of powers.
To challenge liberal optimism in colonial New South Wales was to run
the risk of being dubbed a conservative or a Tory. Consequently the only
serious theorising about the consequences of responsible government in New
South Wales was done by 'conservatives' who were clearly concerned that
the extension of the franchise would destroy the principles of mixed
government and deliver power to a single section of the community. This
concern, in the 1850s at least, was placed in the context of a fear that a
majority of the colonists were lacking in political experience.
These 'conservatives' could not have an institutionalised aristocracy on
the English model but they recognised that checks and balances were
needed if the British Constitution and mixed government were to be
reproduced in Australia. The development of arguments in favour of checks
and balances meant criticising political arrangements that could most easily
be characterised as democracy.
In his series of articles advocating the need for the Australian colonies
to federate John West described, in advance, all of the vices that would
eventually be found in colonial self government in Australia:
Had not the policy of the British Empire prohibited the freaks of
selfishness, we should assuredly find petty legislators covering the
tables of their respective Assemblies with bills for the restriction of
commerce, for the protection of native industry - meaning their own -
for the control of labor; for the encouragement of a slave trade, and
for every encroachment, monopoly, impertinence, and folly which
covetousness of caste and class have ever clothed in the garb of
patriotism. Thus it is obvious that the public spirit of a small
community is no guarantee for the safety of its feebler members, the
equity of its legislation, and the impartiality of its qovernrnent.i"
West argued that the construction of a federal structure for the Australian
colonies was ultimately the best means for achieving this aim of a political
order incorporating checks and balances. As the British political and social
structure could not be reproduced in the colonies, federalism, he argued,
was the form the British constitution must take in new societies derived
from England if something like a mixed constitution was to be preserved. 17
Most other commentators focused on the structure of the Upper House
and on ways that it could be made sufficiently distinct from the Lower
House as to constitute a check to it. The most interesting argument came
from James Norton. He wanted:
A body of senators with as much wisdom as the colony can afford,
free from corrupting influence of the Crown; undaunted by the vulgar
abuse of the mobl8
This would involve the creation of a group of one hundred people who would
be eligible to hold the office of senator. The Legislative Assembly would
then choose twenty one of these men to hold the office of senator, either
for ten years or for life. They would become a de facto aristocracy,
independent, and capable of scrutinizing the activities of the democratic
ossernbly"
What many of the political reformers of the 1850s in New South
Wales wanted was not a democracy in the sense that Parliament would be a
miniature version of the whole community so much as an elected aristocracy
that would serve the public good.
Many of the 'radicals' of the early 1850s, including Henry Parkes and
Daniel Deniehy, became quite conservative in the 1860s. They had an
idealised picture of how British politics worked in which elected legislators
formed a sort of 'natural aristocracy' who would act on behalf of the
community.2o For them, New South Wales simply did not live up to that
model. 'Democracy' could be seen to be the culprit. It lowered the tone of
parliament and coarsened politics which should have been an honourable
profession. Democracy was associated with the huckster and the operator.
After all, the point of electing a legislative body was to elect a group of men
capable of producing legislation beneficial to the community.
Consider the case of Parkes. In 1892 he made the following statement
about the role of democrats in colonial politics:
'The things done and the words spoken in the name of Democracy in
the fair lands of Australia which have the repellent features and
harsh tone of oppression must be familiar to all thoughtful readers.
It would almost seem that when many men talk loudly of freedom,
their meaning is the freedom to trample upon the rights of their
fellow-men.'21
The fact is that many people in colonial New South Wales came to be
profoundly critical of democracy as a form of political organization. This
was not because they were Tory reactionaries. They feared that the
operation of what they understood as a democratic political system did not
really serve the public good.
To understand why they believed this to be case it is worthwhile to
examine nineteenth century understandings of representative government.
Bernard Manin argues that modern representative government is a form of
'mixed government', in that it is only partly democratic. He points out that
representative government has always had aristocratic connotations because
it involved the idea of electing someone who was 'superior' to the electors.22
Hence he notes that the Federalists rejected the notion that the
representative body should reflect, in miniature, the electorate that it
represented. This is also expressed in Burke's conception that the Member
of Parliament should act as a trustee and was not a delegate:
Parliament is a deliberative Assembly of one Nation, with one
Interest, that of the whole; where, not local Purposes, not local
Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good, resulting from the
general Reason of the whole. You chuse a Member indeed; but when
you have chosen him, he is not Member of Bristol, but he is a Member
of Par/iament.23
This was a view held by many Members in Colonial New South Wales as the
following quotes illustrate:
'I sit here as the representative, not the delegate, of my constituents...I
have a duty to discharge to my country.'24
'Politics would then become merely a profession, and the spirit of the
delegate would take the place of the spirit of the representative'25
The Member was considered to be an independent trustee who
considered legislation on its merits and voted according to his judgement and
conscience. The idea of independence and principled behaviour by a Member
of Parliament as a 'trustee' seems to me to be the cornerstone of the values
of the new liberal order.
The post 1856 regime in New South Wales was not construed so much as
being 'democratic' by its participants as understood as being in the tradition
of the British Constitution, and embodying popular and liberal princi pies.
Democracy largely entered into the political vocabulary when writers and
commentators wished to expose the flaws of the political system.
The sorts of faults these critics found with the system can be seen in
the devastating critique made by Henry Parkes of New South Wales politics
made in a speech delivered at Kiama in 1865 at a time when Parkes was
temporarily out of politics. Parkes began with a description of the current
Legislative Assembly
a more mischievous and dangerous body than the Assembly as it now
existed could scarcely be imagined in a free country-mischievous
and dangerous alike from its experience, its self-conceit, and its
utter want of self-respect and just sense of its duties and
responsi biii ti es.'26
Here are many of the classic topoi that critics used to describe the failings
of democratic politics in colonial New South Wales. The members of the
Assembly did not understand the way to behave properly; they lacked the
necessary moral capabilities to carry out their functions and they were
brazen in the over-estimation of their own capacities.
Next Parkes asked why politics had sunk so low. His first, and chief,
cause is revealing. The 'class of gentlemen' who were most vocal condemning
this state of affairs had failed to behave 'like true English gentlemen'
keeping their ground and fighting 'on bravely through the struggle for
power'. Their failure to fight manfully for their principles had led to a
lowering of the standard of public life and, continued Parkes, their presence
'would have effectively repressed that low order of time-serving and
shameless insensibility to the public interest which were the most
conspicuous characteristics of the present Assembly.' 27
Parkes gave a number of other reasons for the 'low' standard of
Parliament. These included the tendency of the political elite to sponsor
supporters who were 'mere creatures of the hour', the apathy of 'many
intelligent men' in not exercising the franchise, the 'jockeying' of others in
elections 'to serve temporary and selfish objects'. Finally he pointed to the
'immense patronage which had sprung up of late years, and which under any
electoral system would have been sufficient to corrupt both Parliament and
people.'28
This is hardly a positive image of the workings of popular institutions,
even allowing for the fact that Parkes was using what might be termed the
rhetoric of opposition. The interesting thing is that, like Deniehy, Parkes'
focus was primarily on people rather than structures, with the singular
example of the amount of patronage. The real problem is that the wrong
type of person has been elected to the legislature. These are selfish men,
often lacking in intelligence and only interested in pursuing their own
particular interests. Popular rule should enable the best to be elected, and
they should then legislate to ensure that the public interest is protected
For a man once described as a leading democrat in the colony Parkes'
solution can be considered somewhat extraordinary:
Let men of property and intelligence mix with the people and take a
steady and consistent interest in their affairs, and on all occasions
afford them the teaching of example in the single-minded
performance of public duty.29
The Legislature can only achieve a 'higher standard of political conduct' if it
is led by educated men who possess the character required to enforce that
conduct. This means the 'true English gentleman ... the man who by education
and association was alive to his own honour, and who valued his name and
personal independence above the favour of any Government.' Moreover 'they
must be careful not to mistake the parvenu for the gentleman'.3D The route
to good government means electing men capable of serving the public good,
who are above the people
The model was aristocratic in the sense that its basic concern was
that the 'best' should rule and that representative institutions were the
best means for achieving this goal. Deniehy, Parkes and West did not make
the democratic assumption that anyone could rule. Some were more suited
than others. In this way responsible government is very much a system of
government predicated on aristocratic principles. It presumes a harmony
between the elected and the elector. The representative acts as an
independent agent once he is elected in seeking the interest of the society
as a whole. For the men of the 1850s the issue was as much about the
selection of independent men who would be able to legislate on behalf of the
whole community as the establishment of a democratic franchise. This
created great problems if, or actually when, when Members of parliament
behaved like '0 Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile
interests.'31
There was no provision in Responsible Government for mechanisms to deal
with a failure in the system. The relationship between the 'aristocratic elite'
and the democratic mass, even in partici patory regimes, has always been
problematic; Clifford Orwin has argued that democracy generally, as
exemplified in the Athenian experience, is based on distrust rather than
trust. Analysing the Mytilenian debate in Thucydides, the speeches of Cleon
and Diodotus, Orwin concludes that
Participation educates... but one of the things that it teaches the
people is to distrust politicians, and so to doubt their own judgment,
and so to distrust politicians yet more. Distrust is therefore an
inevitable inconvenience of democracy
The rift between the people and the politicians cannot be healed. At
best it can be patched by a politician unusually artful at commanding
trust.32
Under an aristocratic state of society this does not become an acute
problem because there is an understanding that the representative or leader
has a right to lead. Pericles had the inestimable advantage of coming from
the family of Cleisthenes, but even then that did not protect him from the
people's wrath when things took a turn for the worse. The real problem
arose when politicians such as Cleon began to appear on the scene and to
manipulate this distrust for their own purposes. What both Deniehy and
Parkes feared was the parvenu, the modern equivalent of Cleon; the man who
could exploit the weaknesses of democracy for his own ends.
Responsible government ran two major risks. The first was that the
'independent gentlemen' would fail to satisfy the desires of the men who
elected them. In these cases the democratic electorate would exact a
revenge on them at the next election. The second was that the 'independent
gentlemen' would satisfy the desires of the electorate by voting for
measures that satisfied merely local interests. How was a member to gain
sufficient legitimacy to act as a trustee in a democratic society if he was
neither an aristocrat nor a demagogue? How was a legislature of this type
to be constrained if it decided to do terrible things? The real issue is that
responsible government lacks a set of checks and balances that can guard
against its unlimited will.
The English Constitution was meant to work as a system of mixed
government in which the various components would actively constrain each
other. The American constitution effectively substituted a republican
separation of powers for mixed government. Hence West had advocated a
federal system because he saw the federal structure as providing a
conservative balance on the excesses of local popular politics. Two other
possible checks remained on the abuse of power in colonial New South
Wales. One was the governor, though his power waned with time. 33 The
other was the Upper House, be it elected by a limited franchise or appointed
by the executive.
However, the conflict between the two houses became a major theme
in colonial politics during the second half of the 19t h century, with the NSW
Upper House vulnerable because it wasn't elected. In the absence of
institutional checks and balances all that remained to make the system work
was, as Parkes pointed out, to educate the populace so that they elected
capable and moral members of Parliament.
A key aspect of the post 1856 polity in New South Wales, however,
was the low esteem in which politicians came to be held. This was a paradox
as the political system could only work effectively if the politicians behaved
as trustees, in effect if they behaved as aristocrats. It was their
'democratic' behaviour that gave politics such a bad name and made critics
see democracy as the problem.
Forster on Democracy:
William Forster was a major player in politics in New South Wales from the
1850s until his death in 1883. For a short time in 1860 he was Premier of
the New South Wales government. Forster, however, was an independently
minded individual who had a reputation for being somewhat difficult and this
limited his effectiveness as a politician. Always renowned as a literary man,
late in his career Forster wrote a number of studies of contemporary
politics, invariably with a keen eye for what was happening in the British
colonies and with a focus on democracy.
What did he understand by the term 'democracy'? He provided two
basic definitions. The first was a social one, 'the complete and absolute
equality of political conditions, and entire absence of political classes of any
sort, so palpably prevail.' The second was essentially a political definition,
'democracy means, or ought to mean, government of, or by the people, as
distinguished from the highest classes, or best, or strongest of the people.'
34
However, in both of his definitions he contrasts democracy with
aristocracy, not with monarchy or despotism. Alexis De Tocqueville has
heavily shaped his appreciation of democracy.35 Forster concedes that De
Tocqueville, 'the highest modern authority on the subject', does not define
democracy in terms of political structures but as "equality of political
condit ions.III 36
As with De Tocqueville, Forster always has aristocracy, and
aristocratic society, in the back of his mind when he is discussing democracy.
He argues that aristocracy is prior to democracy and that all nations have
passed through an aristocratic stage. Democracy arrives when the
'aristocratic spirit' has exhausted itself and 'the democratic spirit
permeates all classes and institutions, unti I a complete equality of political
conditions, at first virtually, and in the end formally, pervades the entire
structure of society.'37
Forster invokes Polybius to support his idea that democracy is a stage
of social and political growth that emerges out of aristocracy. Forster then
proceeds to link this movement from aristocracy to democracy to the idea
that nations, like people go through stages of organic growth. Aristocracy is
the manifestation of young manhood, vigorous and lively. Forster considers
that Ancient Greece and Rome along with medieval Italy were freer and 'in
every respect more liberal and progressive,38 than they would later become.
Democracy comes with maturity, 'it is as inevitable as maturity in animal life'
and is consequently but a step from 'senility and dissolution.r"
Democracy means the equality of political and social conditions.
Therefore, for Forster it is perfectly compatible with despotism and
military dictatorship. In fact, Forster believes that despotism is the
ultimate outcome of this equality of conditions:
the antiquated and changeless nations of the East...we are able to
trace, in comparatively civilized communities, the final effects of
democratic maturity, and extreme development, in perfect social and
political equality, in chronic despotism, organic stagnation, and
hopeless national degeneracy.4o
Although Forster invokes Polybius, his account of the origin and
development of government is not really Polybian in nature. The Polybian
scheme is an endless cycle of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy driven
by the stasIS-that the degenerate forms of these regimes create.41 Forster
does not accept the idea that it is possible to halt the process of regime
change through the establishment of a form of mixed government as in the
case of Rome. Instead he views republican Rome as essentially aristocratic
in nature.
In part this is because he transposes the Tocquevillian understanding of
aristocracy and democracy as social states onto what is essentially a political
understanding of history. Polybius placed monarchy prior to aristocracy in
his explanation of the origin of government while Forster makes it a
consequence of a democratic social state. Forster links his understanding of
the Polybian scheme with an organic model of national development that is
clearly derived from nineteenth century Romantic sources. The process of
history is inexorable, moving towards democracy and the decay of old age.
There can be no cheating of the aging process.
This makes the 'East' the 'Old Age' of the human race towards which
European countries are invariably moving as they become more democratic.
Such a model stands in stark contrast to the Hegelian/Marxist model that
moves from East to West, from oriental despotism to European freedom.
Hence, for Forster, democracy is not part of the story of human freedom
but an element of its fall from freedom to despotism. He states that 'in
many nations despotism was unknown until democracy was first
estcblished.:" Republicanism is linked to aristocracy, not to democracy.
Forster argues that 'no really effective republic has ever yet long continued
in a democratic community.'43
Combining Polybius and de Tocqueville with an organic understanding of
national development, Forster constructs a picture of democracy that is
quite different to that of many later thinkers. His characterisation of
democracy stands in stark contrast with a twentieth century commentator
such as Keith Hancock who also used an organic model of national growth but
saw Australian democracy as an expression of national immctur-ity."
Forster's affinity is much more with C H Pearson who, in National Life and
Character, published in the early 1890s, associated the coming of 'state
socialism' with the creation of a static society moving towards entropy.45
Having associated democracy with what he termed' the symptoms of
declining nationality' Forster was then able to descri be the range of
'symptoms' that democracy brought into being. These can be summarised as
follows:
Nations are no longer inspired by 'great national ideas'. As a consequence
the standards of politics declines, and the public interest gives way to local
and particular interests. Parties cease to embody principles and instead
become collections 'of individuals or local delegates', bound together by their
leaders. In such an environment inferior men replace 'great statesmen and
politicians, who are the proper and necessary exponents of great ideas and
principles'. Politics becomes a matter of attaining office and helping one's
friends and relatives. Men of intellect and enterprise cease to enter politics
and without them 'legislation deteriorates, and oratory... in becoming more
common, becomes also less forcible and effective, and less distinguished for
excellencies of style and composition.' In its place there appears a
'superabundance of speech' and public opinion equally declines."
In this characterisation of democracy as national decline Forster
emphasises the emerging victory of the particular over the universal. As
particular interests and particular ideas come to predominate over general
ones the nation loses its sense of its mission. It loses its moral bearings and
its capacity for greatness. One wonders if his real model here is less
Polybius than Sal lust , with its emphasis on the decline of virtue.
Forster linked moral decline and the victory of particular interests to
the growth of larrikinism and the emergence of anti-Chinese sentiment in
Australia. He argued that 'A considerable majority of intelligent and socially
disinterested people in the colonies' disapproved of the 'oppressive and
arbitrary legislation' the Chinese had to suffer, 'and, above all of the brutal
treatment to which Chinamen are subjected; but, nevertheless, in obedience
to the highly moral prejudices, and obvious class interests, of the voting
majority, not only are oppressive and specially differential laws passed ...but
the most brutal and unprovoked insults and injuries are inflicted upon
Chinamen, generally with impunity, by groups of ruffians,.47
For Forster, the triumph of particularism and sectionalism over
universal and national values. is the inevitable consequence of democracy.
Like Bruce Smith, whose Liberty and Liberalism appeared a few years after
Forster's death, Forster feared that democracy would lead to the funding of
'local' or 'class interests,.48 Democracy, he feared, would lead to a policy of
protection the regulation of the hours of labour and the increased taxation
of 'large properties to the exclusion of small' ones.49
The deleterious effects of democracy were not just limited to the
emergence of sectional legislation. Under a democratic regime, according to
Forster, parliament attempts to 'absorb into its own hands the governing and
executive, and in some degree even the judicial powers' so that it alone could
be the focus of political power. 50 Parliamentary dominance tended to
destroy both the separation of powers and checks and balances. Even worse,
Forster claimed that Parliament now lacked the capacity to govern
effectively and consequently the art of good government was being eroded.
Parliament had become merely a forum for 'indiscriminate discussion', a place
where words were a substitute for action. 51
Aristocratic regimes had a real capacity for government; democratic
regimes have a capacity for talking and the consequence is the decline of
good government and effective administration:
in democracy there is nothing to counteract the popular will, and now
this democratic formula goes simply to the subversion of all
authority...so that the art of government, so far as it is exercised at
all, is reduced to a simple process of counting votes or noses.52
Democracy involves not only the triumph of sectional interests over national
ones but also the substitution of what Forster terms personal government
for party government based on principle. Parties, he argues, originally were
based on a 'common nationality'. They had a strong sense of principle and
obligation. Principle, however, declines as nationality declines leaving only
the men who lead the parties. As principle evaporates and personality grows
in importance parties become rancorous and unscrupulous.V
Forster clearly has based this model of party and political
development on his experience in colonial politics as is made clear by his
analysis of the development of colonial politics. He claims that when
responsible government was introduced there were two parties. He
describes these parties as 'old fogeyism' on the one hand and the 'men of
new ideas' combined with 'the large class who had personal passions to
gratify, or personal wrongs avenge' on the other. The Land Question was the
one major issue of principle. It was resolved by an 'able popular leader',
John Robertson, by serving simultaneously both his own and the public
interest.54
The one other popular leader who could have challenged the policies of
Robertson, Henry Parkes, chose to join in a coalition with Robertson. The
outcome was an extension of personal politics. If Parkes and Robertson
could not agree on a political question they simply pushed it to one side. In
the place of political principle Forster saw instead the 'formal concrete
embodiment of the gospel of self' and the triumph of personal interests over
political principle.55 He believed that this was linked to the election of
members who were returned 'upon purely local and personal grounds', who
were incapable of dealing with 'politics in their higher forms'. Parliament
reflected the quality of its members; mainly minor matters were discussed,
sectional and personal interests predominated and 'large sums of public
money were voted into the pockets of at least one minister, and friends of
ministers.'56
Writing fifteen years after Parkes, Forster agrees with much of
Parkes' analysis only now the target of his barbs is Parkes. It is also clear
that Forster was measuring colonial politics against some sort of ideal of
British politics. That model was essentially aristocratic in nature. Elected
representatives should behave like trustees. They should be able to grasp
the wider issues and not be concerned with just the local and the personal.
Forster, like Parkes, was engaging in a rhetorical denunciation of the political
system that both of them had helped to establish but which did not measure
up to their ideal of the British model. Most importantly it seemed to be
unable to deliver good government and the source of that failure could be
summed up in the word democracy.
Forster paints rather dismal picture of this failure as 'the perversion
of order, law, and justice, by the intimidation of police, and the exercise of
corrupt influence over courts' that has only been 'in large measure
counteracted, by the presence and partial interference of a British
Governor, and by British connections and ossocictions.f" In place of good
government Forster saw attempts to follow and manipulate public opinion.
As with Parkes, Forster identified the abandonment of the public
sphere by men of character and standing as a real problem of democracy.
Instead of men acting as trustees of the public good Parliament was full of
parvenus. Forster identified this condition with Tocqueville's 'Individualism',
citing as its cause 'despair of the political future,.58 His judgement on
democracy is very harsh:
imperfect or merely apparent government, which exemplifies and
expresses the tendency of democratic communities under
representative forms of government to reduce the ostensible
machinery and operations of the quasi-governing body or ruling
element to a practical non-entity, and to substitute for the reality of
government and executive action merely a plausible or pretentious
copy, or, at best, a weak embodiment and representction.f"
The overall argument is quite simple. Democratic government has become
bad government because it has moved beyond the virtues of aristocratic
rule. In a purely democratic community there is nothing to check the
excesses of democratic rule. Democracy had once been a check against the
excesses of monarchy and aristocracy. Pure democracy exists in a sort of
vacuum in which there is nothing to check its deficiencies.
Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that democracy ultimately
engenders a form of paralysis or anarchy where no one rules and society
decays. This would still seem to lead to the Polybian scenario where the only
option is rule by one man. The only other solution is mixed government.
Ultimately Forster was driven back to a re-working of the themes of mixed
government.
In 1881 and 1882 he published two articles in the Sydney University
Review on the issue of upper houses in the colonies. He argued that in a
democracy there was no real basis for supporting the idea of a second
chamber. Its advocates, he claimed, used utilitarian arguments or ones
based on expediency. It was useful to have an independent and separate
chamber.60 Once the Upper House attempted to be independent it was open
to attack because it lacked the 'democratic' foundation of the Assembly."
Moreover, argued Forster, unscrupulous leaders in the Assembly
attacked the Upper House as a means of keeping their majorities in line. He
claimed that
When the Ministerial majority in the Lower House shows any sign of
withdrawing or relaxing its allegiance ...a very obvious resource is a
gratuitous quarrel with the Upper House, brought about, it may be,
upon some very trivial pretext. Experience teaches that all quarrels
are apt to be bitter, in inverse proportion to their siqnif iconce'"
By attacking the Upper House, premiers were able to appear as champions of
the popular will, and to intimidate the other chamber into complying with
their will. Forster claims that in fact there is no constitutional reason for
accepting the inferiority of the Upper House. 'Both houses...especially in the
Colonies,' he argued, 'derive their origin from the same legal or constitutional
sources, and exist by the same popular or national will.'63
It is the democratic sentiment, not constitutional reality, that enables
Lower House dominance .. In such circumstances he argues that it might be
better to have a single chamber so that a democratic chamber is not able to
push the blame for political mistakes elsewhere and so must face up to its
public responsibilities.t" Hence Forster comes to a somewhat alarming
preliminary finding:
Thus democracy contradicts constitutional traditions. Time was,
when the idea of political independence was almost exclusively
associated with popular support, and direct representation of the
people, or of a constituency. It is somewhat new to find it connected
with, and in a measure dependent on, nomination for life by the
Government, or by the Crown through its representotive.V
The Lower House was failing because it was not properly checked; it had
become despotic and overbearing. It needed to be checked by an
independent chamber. But in a democratic community an effective Upper
House also required a democratic sanction. The irony for Forster was that 'in
political aptitude in debating power, in all the essential attributes and
qualifications for the work of Government and Legislation, the superiority of
nominee Houses in the colonies...over the elected branches of the
Legislature, are universally ocknowledqed.f"
Forster's solution is to combine the nominee principle with the
democratic one. The executive will choose a pool of people that have the
experience and character to be legislators. Out of that pool the electorate
will elect, from time to time, members to sit in the Upper House.67 Forster
even foresaw the day when the House of Lords would be composed of life
peers chosen by proportional representction.t'' In this way Forster thought
that the Upper House would be independent, be filled with a superior type of
member and possess democratic legitimacy. It may even be able to escape
the 'two besetting sins of democracy, namely, localism and demagogism.'69
Conclusion
Forster's proposal was, in effect, an attempt to reconstruct a quasi-
aristocratic model of responsible government, or, in reality, mixed
government. Forster's proposal for the Upper House resembles in many ways
the one that J ames Norton had proposed some thirty years earlier, only
Forster made the election by the people rather than by the Lower House.
The twin evils of democracy, demagogism and localism, were precisely those
identified by John West in the 1850s.
The consistency in critiques of democracy from the 1850s to the 1880s is
not surprising. There would to be a common rhetoric used by participants in
politics to describe and criticise democracy. That rhetoric revolved around
two elements. One was an emphasis on the need to get the best people into
Parliament so that the public good was protected. The other was an attempt
to find a new basis for mixed government, the mode of government that
Ward notes the colonists had rejected . Both of these themes can be found
in Forster's work.
Forster's critique of the workings of responsible government within what he
sees as a democratic framework is both astringent and acute. Responsible
government in a democratic setting provides little in checks and balances
beyond that between the two houses of parliament. In the years following
the granting of responsible government the power of the governor declined.
The Upper House had its power increasingly restricted. Power was
increasingly concentrated in the Legislative Assembly. Responsible
government ceased to be mixed government and it lacked a strict separation
of powers. In this sense Forster was correct to link democracy with
despotism, as the Assembly came to be able to exert despotic power
constrained only by periodic elections and the, increasingly unlikely,
intervention by imperial authorities.
In such circumstances all the vices that West , and other critics of
democracy had already identified could flourish. The Australian colonies
were able to reap all the benefits that real democracy could offer.
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